Skip to main content

​
The same thesis, one layer down

An HTTP API has an OpenAPI spec; a Solana program has an on-chain instruction↔account↔PDA graph. Both are surfaces an agent must understand before it can act — and both lose something the agent needs: an Anchor IDL (or an llms.txt built from one) drops the PDA seed recipes, so the agent derives the wrong accounts and the transaction fails. The Program Surface is Gecko’s on-chain surface: it recovers those seed recipes from program source and derives the PDAs first-plan-correct — the accounts a naive IDL tool omits or gets wrong.

​
Gecko comprehends; the builder accesses

Gecko does the comprehension, not the access. It recovers the dropped seeds and derives the accounts. Orquestra does the access — it builds and submits the transaction against the program. Gecko fills the derivation gap and hands the plan to the builder to execute. Gecko never signs and never replaces the builder.
Control plane, on-chain too: Gecko derives addresses and returns a plan. It holds no keys, signs nothing, and moves no funds — the same invariant as the HTTP path.

​
Proven on four mainnet programs

Every derivation is verified against real mainnet accounts on a local surfpool fork — $0, read-only, no signing — each program with a gap a naive IDL tool gets wrong: Jupiter is the fifth wired surface and is not in this table, because its gap is a different kind. Its missing accounts are not derivable from any IDL — they are the legs of a route an HTTP surface computed a second earlier, so they arrive tagged cross_surface rather than recovered from seeds. Same plan, different mechanism.

​
Serve one

Not sure where to start? Route an intent to the right (program, instruction) first:
See find_start for the provenance-tagged derive plan it returns.

​
Simulate before you spend

A derived account set is not yet a landed transaction. The plan goes to an external builder, Gecko assembles the unsigned preludes, simulates on a $0 mainnet fork, and returns a Receipt — pass, or a categorical revert class — before any signature exists. That loop is live-proven twice: a Pump.fun buy where the naive derive-only path reverts with AccountNotInitialized (3012) and Gecko’s bundle passes at 86,669 CU, and a Meteora DLMM swap (wrap → swap across live bins → unwrap) at 81,964 CU. Both on a surfpool mainnet fork — a mainnet-backed snapshot, not mainnet — simulation only, $0, nothing signed or broadcast.

​
Safe to sign

Gecko’s anti-poisoning verdict can gate a downstream custody/signing layer: it refuses to sign for a tool Gecko quarantined, so the key holder only ever signs what Gecko cleared. Gecko comprehends the call; the builder builds it; the vault signs it. The gate today is verdict-based. Binding it to the exact simulated message hash is not built yet.